How did this project go so wrong?
A proper independent inquiry is needed, because of the harm done to us, waste of public money and Network Rail's history of poor project management. And because the government wants to hugely expand their role. But over the years it's become clear that there have been a number of things very wrong about this project from the start.
The tail is wagging the dog. And it’s not even the dog’s tail
This is a railway project, about upgrading and increasing capacity at Oxford station, and it’s been undertaken by a railway company. But somebody suggested that while they were digging around the bridge, they might make improvements to the highway as well: deepening the roadway under the bridge, and improving pedestrian and cycle paths. This highways work, specifically deepening the roadway, has completely taken over the project, swallowed much of the money and caused nearly all the delay. Which begs the question . . . who asked for this?
Where’s the customer?
It’s a mystery who actually asked for the highways work. When I spoke to the highways people, they didn’t recall asking. The requirement is there in the Department of Transport Business Case, and in Network Rail’s submission to the city council. But the Department of Transport don’t think it was them. The county council always talk of this as Network Rail’s project and Network Rail’s responsibility. There is a peculiar distancing of the highway authority from a major highways project, one that is having a catastrophic effect on the council’s own transport strategy. There is fundamental lack of ownership of the highways work, and that is particularly so when it comes to the spec. for deepening the roadway . . .
It's a mystery who actually asked for the highways work.′
Deeper still, and deeper
The roadway has to be slightly deepened, because the width (east/west) of the bridge will increase. But Network Rail’s submission and business case say that a more radical deepening of the highway under the bridge is necessary, because standard model buses can’t get under it, so the bus company has to have special models built, just to squeeze under this bridge. Fair enough: except, it’s not true. In their comments on the draft proposal, which I’ve got a copy of, the highways people say, very clearly, that existing buses are standard models and did pass under the bridge just fine. This is confirmed by the statement in this book by the MD of the Oxford Bus Company — who ought to know. Still, the county council thought a much deeper roadway a good idea. Why?
Buses, and the future evolution of homo sapiens
In the paper, the highways authority people said that it would be a good idea to have a much deeper roadway under the railway bridge, even though buses passed under the existing one OK, because in the course of the next 100 years, it is possible that human beings might grow taller and thus need taller buses. Yes, I know, incredible; and yes, I have the proof. Is this why the project ran out of control — because someone in the highways authority had a thought about the course of the future evolution of our species? Surprising. Talking of which . . .
Every day, a fresh surprise
A consistent feature of this project has been that everything in the real world takes Network Rail by surprise. And every such surprise leads to a project extension. One can see this right from the outset, when Network Rail’s submission to the city council included many hundreds of pages of detail and technical drawings about the railway work, but only the merest outline of the highways work. Indeed, the whole of 2022 was taken up with Network Rail and Kier beginning to learn about what they had taken on. And the answer was a succession of problems which they had not foreseen. They were astonished to find so many utilities under the road (one might ask why hadn’t the highways authority got accurate and comprehensive details of what was there?). Then they were surprised to discover that they haven’t got legal power to compel utilities to work with them. Then there was the Victorian structure underground — which contrary to some reports, Network Rail did know about beforehand, they didn’t know how big it was.
This characteristic of constant surprise and repeated delay is evident in other parts of the project, too. For example, the replacement to the pedestrian bridge from Mill Street into town over the railway. This was billed to close on 26 July 2023 and reopen 9 days later, on 9 August. In fact, Network Rail/Kier found ‘unexpected’ things, like drug paraphernalia, as a result of which the footbridge was not reopened until 16 October, a time overrun of nearly 900%.
I’m familiar with major construction projects. Yes, unexpected things do crop up. But you minimise them by the fullest possible research before you start, and by a project plan which can respond to the unexpected without being thrown entirely off course. Neither seem to be the case here. Network Rail, whose business is managing projects, don’t seem to be terribly good at ... managing projects.
When is a contract not a contract?
I suspect this is closely linked to the type of contract between Network Rail and Kier. Basic elements of effective contracting are a clear definition of what is required and by when at what cost, penalties for non-compliance, clear arrangements for monitoring and measuring progress, and for dealing with problems and agreeing solutions as they come up. In essence, a division of roles: the contracting authority states what’s to be done, and the contractor then delivers.
We don’t know what the contract between Network Rail and Kier looks like, but it must be rather odd, because every time Kier have a problem they just add to the time scale and add to the cost. Moreover the boundary between the two is not clear — at times Network Rail seemed to have been using Kier more as its own labour force than a separate contractor charged with getting things done. My guess is the contract looks like a very old fashioned ‘cost plus' contract, which pays the contractors’ costs stage by stage, whatever they may be, plus profit. The obvious drawback to such a contract is that if the contractor finds something difficult or novel or just more difficult than expected, they can bill you extra and add to the timescale. There is therefore no incentive to keep costs down or to keep to timescale. Quite the reverse!
The highways authority that disappeared
The county council has always viewed the whole project, including the highways work, as somebody else’s problem. And here there are a couple of curious legal ambiguities. Network Rail is a ‘statutory authority’ which means it has a statutory right to work on roads but this is limited to the purpose of ‘maintaining and operating railway infrastructure’. And I wonder whether the work of widening and deepening the highway, done explicitly for ’highways’ and not ‘railway purposes’, is really covered by this power, particularly since that work extends hundreds of metres away from the railway?
And any utility proposing to make a permanent alteration to the highway must form a section 278 agreement (under the Highways Act 1980) with the highways authority, in which the proposed changes are set out in great detail. Now, the county council told me last year that they would 'shortly' agree a section 278 agreement with Network Rail. But as of August this year, they still have not done so. That seems legally interesting. If, for the past 18 months, Network Rail/Kier have not been making a permanent alteration to the highway, what exactly have they been doing?
What the county council is certainly responsible for is safe road management. Yet they have allowed a chaotic mish-mash of temporary bus stops, lights, crossings, barriers and diversions to sprout up that are unsafe and are increasingly ignored by a fed-up public.
All through this saga the county council have insisted they have no power whatever over what Network Rail do. Those were precisely the words to me before the closure of the road by Andrew Gant, county council Cabinet Member for Transport Management. That seems to imply if the Network Rail starts work on the highway and then never complete it, they can just go on and on for ever, which is what they appear to be doing. I’m not a lawyer but I don’t believe that is the case. Surely the highways authority could and should have robustly challenged NR’s work plans?
All in all, the highways authority seems to have been strangely passive.
What the council clearly is responsible for its road management - yet it has allowed a chaotic and dangerous mish-mash of lights, crossings, barriers and closures to grow up which are increasingly ignored by a fed-up public.′
Network Rail — the last Soviet state
All organisations have their own culture. Network Rail's is very strange indeed. Although notionally a company, its style is more bureaucratic than commercial (e.g. see Andy Jones' statement). It is secretive. Every construction project nowadays gives the name and contact details of its project manager outside the site, for all to see (as Kier did). Network Rail refused even to identify their project manager. Indeed, there doesn't seem to be any one person in charge, more like a big bureaucracy.
They are poor at working with others — the county council Cabinet Member for Transport Management told me they were extremely difficult to work with and did not share information. Several of the statements in this report make the same complaint. That is also my experience, in our neighbourhood association.
They are the opposite of open. Network Rail refused to attend a public meeting at the start of the project, walked out of meetings with the community because they felt criticised, and took well over a year even to answer requests from small businesses to meet them. They also gave undertakings which they did not honour.
Network Rail is not publicly accountable. In theory, is it accountable to Parliament through the Minister. But it is very difficult for an MP to get a debate on a local issue involving Network Rail — there’ve been only two debates of this kind in the near quarter century of its existence, and strikingly, on both occasions MPs have complained of its arrogrance and lack of proper accountability. Our MP asked to see him in July: she finally got to see him in December. 5 months!
Moreover the Minister, Lord Hendy, was until a few months ago ... Chair of Network Rail! How can you be accountable to yourself?
In organisations, lack of openness and accountability is often associated with failure.
Noises off
It is clear that Network Rail was fully capable of making a complete mess of the project all by itself. But it’s been helped in this endeavour by a number of other large corporations making an equal hash of things on Botley Road. For example, the water supply to Oxford runs underneath the bridge over the Thames, near the station. In 2021 an Environment Agency boat managed to steer into the pipe and break it. Ever since then there’s been a temporary pipe. It’s taken 3 years for Thames Water to start doing something about it. This is taking the form of imposing one way working on the river bridge, just yards in front of Network Rail’s barricade under the railway bridge. This has been maintained for full year — even though no work was done in summer, at the Environment Agency's insistence. Thus drivers encounter 3 sets of traffic lights within a space of little more than 100 metres. To add insult to injury, for much of the summer no work was done, and the closed lane was used only for parking the private cars of Thames Water ‘workers’.
Getting into the spirit of things, National Highways announced that the interchange where the western end of Botley Road is connected to the ring road was in need of repair, and they reduced that to one way working for 6 months, which had the effect of backing up traffic at peak times into queues several hours long on the bypass. Yet the work was only done at night! Therefore all day every day the traffic was being held up, without anybody actually working on the site. Big corporations, public or private, seem indifferent to the chaos they cause.